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Proxy re-encryption allows a semi-trusted proxy with a re-encryption key to convert a 
delegator’s ciphertext into a delegatee’s ciphertext, and the semi-trusted proxy cannot 
learn anything about the underlying plaintext. If a proxy re-encryption scheme is 
indistinguishable against chosen-ciphertext attacks, its initialized ciphertext should be non-
malleable. Otherwise, there might exist an adversary who can break the chosen-ciphertext 
security of the scheme. Recently, Liang et al. proposed two proxy re-encryption schemes. 
They claimed that their schemes were chosen-ciphertext secure in the standard model. 
However, we ﬁnd that the original ciphertext in their schemes are malleable. Thus, we 
present some concrete attacks and indicate their schemes fail to achieve chosen-ciphertext 
security in the standard model.
© 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
The notion of proxy re-encryption (PRE) was initially introduced by Blaze et al. [1]. In a PRE system, Alice can transform 
the ciphertext which is encrypted under her public key to another ciphertext which is encrypted under Bob’s public key, so 
that Alice can securely share her information to Bob. According to the direction of transformation, PRE can be categorized 
into an undirectional PRE and a bidirectional PRE. In the unidirectional PRE, the ciphertext can be transformed from Alice 
to Bob. But in the bidirectional PRE, the ciphertext can be transformed not only from Alice to Bob, but it also can be 
transformed from Bob to Alice. According to another function, PRE can be categorized into a single-hop PRE and a multi-hop 
PRE. In the single-hop PRE, the ciphertext can only be transformed one time. But in the multi-hop PRE, the transformed 
ciphertext can continuously be transformed to the another user. PRE is a very useful primitive, it has many applications, 
such as encrypted e-mail forwarding, key distribution, access control and distributed ﬁle systems [2–10].
Chosen-ciphertext security is one of the most important goals to construct a PRE scheme. In 1998, Blaze et al. [1]
proposed a bidirectional PRE scheme with chosen-plaintext security. In 2007, Canetti and Hohenberger [11] deﬁned a 
chosen-ciphertext security model for the PRE scheme and proposed two bidirectional multi-hop PRE schemes with chosen-
ciphertext security. One is proved in the random oracle model. The other one is proved in the standard model. After that, 
many bidirectional secure PRE schemes (e.g. [12,13]) have been proposed. Any unidirectional PRE scheme can be easily 
transformed to a bidirectional one by running the former in both directions, while whether the reverse holds is unknown. 
In 2005, Ateniese et al. [8,9] ﬁrst presented two practical unidirectional PRE schemes from bilinear map and both of the 
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two schemes are chosen-plaintext secure. In 2008, Libert and Vergnaud [14] proposed the ﬁrst unidirectional PRE scheme 
against replayable chosen-ciphertext attacks in the standard model. Since then, many unidirectional PRE schemes with 
chosen-ciphertext security have been proposed (e.g., [15–18]) and all these schemes are single-hop PRE schemes.
If a PRE scheme is in the identity-based setting [19], each user’s public key is the user’s identity, (e.g. email address). In 
2007, Green and Ateniese [20] proposed the ﬁrst unidirectional identity-based proxy re-encryption (IBPRE) scheme, which 
is chosen-ciphertext secure in the random oracle model. Then, many IBPRE schemes have been proposed, such as [21,10,
22–29].
In order to facilitate ﬁne-grained access control in the PRE or IBPRE system, the type-based PRE scheme [30] and the 
conditional PRE scheme [31] were proposed. In both cases, the proxy can re-encrypt the ciphertext if and only if the 
condition in the ciphertext is the same as in the re-encryption key. In 2009, Weng et al. [32] proposed a new conditional 
PRE scheme with chosen-ciphertext security and re-formed the deﬁnition and security notion for a conditional PRE scheme. 
Additionally, they pointed out the secure risk in the scheme [31].
Recently, Liang et al. proposed two identity-based conditional PRE schemes. One is a unidirectional single-hop condi-
tional PRE (UniSH-IBCPRE) scheme [33], the other one is a bidirectional multi-hop conditional PRE (BiMH-IBCPRE) scheme 
[34]. They claimed that their schemes can achieve chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model. However, we ﬁnd the 
original ciphertext in their schemes cannot ensure the non-malleability. There may exist an adversary who can break the 
security of their schemes. For example, given a challenge ciphertext CT ∗I D∗i = Enc(I D
∗
i , mβ) = (· · · , C∗, · · · ) under the target 
identity I D∗i , where the ciphertext component C
∗ is not veriﬁed. First, the adversary modiﬁes C∗ to C ′ , so it obtains another 
ciphertext CT ′I D∗i = (· · · , C
′, · · · ). Then, it issues a re-encryption query on CT ′I D∗i to achieve another ciphertext CT
′
I D j
under 
a corrupted user I D j . Note that it is legal for the adversary to issue the re-encryption query. Since (I D∗i , CT
′
I D∗i
) is not 
a derivative of (I D∗i , CT
∗
I D∗i
). Next, the adversity uses the corrupted user I D j ’s private key skID j to derive the underlying 
plaintext from the ciphertext CT ′I D j .
Based on the above analysis, in this paper, we present an outside adversary to break the chosen-ciphertext security of 
Liang et al.’s schemes [33,34] and an inside adversity to break the chosen-ciphertext security of [33]. The outside adversary 
does not collude with the semi-trusted proxy. The inside adversity is a semi-trusted proxy, who can collude with a delegatee. 
Thus, we indicate that their schemes fail to achieve chosen-ciphertext security.
1.1. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the bilinear map and the decisional bilinear 
Diﬃe–Hellman assumption. In section 3, we ﬁrst review the deﬁnition, the security model and the construction of Liang et 
al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE scheme [33], and then we present the security analysis for the UniSH-IBCPRE scheme. In section 4, we 
ﬁrst review the deﬁnition, the security model and the construction of Liang et al.’s BiMH-IBCPRE scheme [34], and then we 
present the security analysis for the BiMH-IBCPRE scheme. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Bilinear map
G and GT are cyclic multiplicative groups of order p, g is a generator of G . A bilinear map is a map e : G×G → GT with 
the following properties:
• Bilinearity: e(ga1, gb2) = e(g1, g2)ab for all g1, g2 ∈ G and a, b ∈Z∗p .• Non-degeneracy: There exists g1, g2 ∈ G such that e(g1, g2) = 1G .
• Computability: There exists an eﬃcient algorithm to compute e(g1, g2) for g1, g2 ∈ G .
2.2. Decisional Bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman (DBDH) assumption
The DBDH problem in a bilinear group (p, G, GT , e) is deﬁned as follows: Given a tuple (g, ga, gb, gc, T ) as input, out-
put 1 if T = e(g, g)abc and 0 otherwise. The advantage of an algorithm A in solving the DBDH problem is deﬁned as 
AdvDBDHA = |Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) = 1] −Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, T ) = 1]|, where g ∈ G, a, b, c ←Z∗p , T is chosen randomly 
from GT . We say that the DBDH assumption holds in the bilinear group (p, G, GT , e) if all probabilistic polynomial-time 
(PPT) algorithms have negligible advantage in solving the DBDH problem.
3. Cryptanalysis of Liang et al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE scheme
In this section, ﬁrst, we shall review the deﬁnition, the security model and the construction of Liang et al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE 
scheme [33]. Then, we give the security analysis for their construction.
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3.1. Review the deﬁnition of Liang et al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE scheme
Deﬁnition 1. A UniSH-IBCPRE scheme 
∏ = (Setup, KeyGen, ReKeyGen, Enc, ReEnc, Dec2, Dec1) consists of the following 
seven algorithms.
• Setup(1λ): On input a security parameter 1λ , output a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk.
• KeyGen(msk, I D): On input mpk, msk and an identity I D ∈ {0, 1}n , output a private key skID .
• ReKeyGen(mpk, skIDi , I D j, w): On input mpk, the private key skIDi of an identity I Di , an identity I D j and a condition 
w ∈ {0, 1}∗ , output a re-encryption key rkw|I Di→I D j from I Di to I D j under w .
• Enc(mpk, I Di, w, m): On input mpk, an identity I Di , a condition w and a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}λ , output a original cipher-
text C (2)(I Di ,w) .
• ReEnc(mpk, rkw|I Di→I D j , I Di, w, C (2)(I Di ,w)): On input mpk, a re-encryption key rkw|I Di→I D j , an identity I Di , a condition 
w and a original ciphertext C (2)(I Di ,w) , output a transformed ciphertext C
(1)
(I D j ,w)
.
• Dec2(mpk, I Di, skIDi , w, C (2)(I Di ,w)): On input mpk, an identity I Di and the corresponding private key skIDi , a condition 
w and a original ciphertext C (2)
(I Di ,w)
, output a plaintext m or ⊥ for failure.
• Dec1(mpk, I Di, I D j, skID j , w, C (1)(I D j ,w)): On input mpk, an identity I Di , an identity I D j and the corresponding private 
key a skID j , a condition w and a transformed ciphertext C
(1)
(I D j ,w)
, output a plaintext m or ⊥ for failure.
3.2. Review the security model of Liang et al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE scheme
We review the adaptive condition and adaptive identity chosen ciphertext security (IND-aCon-aID-CCA) model of Liang 
et al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE scheme [33]. In their model, C is a challenger who plays the below game with a adversary A.
• Setup: Challenger C runs Setup(1λ) and sends mpk to A.
• Query Phase I: Adversary A is given access to the following oracles:
◦ Extract(ID): Given an identity I D , return skID ← KeyGen(msk, I D) and I D is considered as corrupted.
◦ ReKeyExtract(I Di, I D j, w): Given two distinct identities I Di and I D j , and a condition w , return rkw|I Di→I D j ←
ReKeyGen(skIDi , I D j, w), where skIDi ← KeyGen(msk, I Di).
◦ ReEnc(I Di, I D j, w, C (2)(I Di ,w)): Given two distinct identities I Di and I D j , a condition w and a original cipher-
text C (2)(I Di ,w) , return a transformed ciphertext C
(1)
(I D j ,w)
← ReEnc(rkw|I Di→I D j , I Di, w, C (2)(I Di ,w)), where skIDi ←
KeyGen(msk, I Di) and rkw|I Di→I D j ← ReKeyGen(skIDi , I D j, w).
◦ Dec2(I Di, w, C (2)(I Di ,w)): Given an identity I Di , a condition w and a original ciphertext C
(2)
(I Di ,w)
, return m ←
Dec2(I Di, skIDi , w, C
(2)
(I Di ,w)
), where skIDi ← KeyGen(msk, I Di).
◦ Dec1(I Di, I D j, w, C (1)(I D j ,w)): Given two identity I Di , I D j , a condition w and a transformed ciphertext C
(1)
(I D j ,w)
, return 
m ← Dec1(I Di, I D j, skID j , w, C (1)(I D j ,w)), where skID j ← KeyGen(msk, I D j).
• Challenge: Adversary A outputs two equal-length plaintexts m0, m1, a target identity I D∗ and a target condition w∗
to C . If the following queries: Extract(I D∗): I D∗ is uncorrupt identity. ReKeyExtract(I D∗, I D j, w∗): Extract(I D j) for any 
identity I D j are never queried, C outputs C (2)∗(I D∗,w∗) = Enc(I D∗, w∗, mb), where b ∈ R {0,1}.
• Query Phase II: Adversary A makes further queries as in Query Phase I except the following: Extract(I D) if 
I D = I D∗; ReKeyExtract(I D∗, I D j, w∗) and Extract(I D j) for any identity I D j ; ReEnc(I D∗, I D j, w∗, C (2)∗(I D∗,w∗)) and 
Extract(I D j) for any identity I D j ; Dec2(I D∗, w∗, C (2
∗)
(I D∗,w∗)) and Dec1(I D
∗, I D j, w∗, C (1)(I D j ,w∗)) for any (I D j, C
(1)
(I D j ,w∗)), 
if (I D j, w∗, C (1)(I D j ,w∗)) is a derivative of (I D
∗, w∗, C (2)∗(I D∗,w∗)). As of [11], the derivative of (I D∗, w∗, C
(2)∗
(I D∗,w∗)) is deﬁned 
as follows.
1. If adversary A has issued a re-encryption key query on (I D∗, I D j, w∗) to obtain the re-encryption key rkw∗|I D∗i →I D j , 
computed C (1)(I D j ,w∗) ← ReEnc(rkw∗|I D∗→I D j , I D∗, w∗, C
(2)∗
(I D∗,w∗)), then (I D j, w
∗, C (1)(I D j ,w∗)) is a derivative of (I D
∗, w∗,
C (2)∗
(I D∗,w∗)).
2. If adversary A has issued a re-encryption query on (I D∗, w∗, C (2)∗
(I D∗,w∗)) and obtained C
(1)
(I D j ,w∗) , then (I D j, w
∗ , 
C (1)(I D j ,w∗)) is a derivative of (I D
∗, w∗, C (2)∗(I D∗,w∗)).
• Guess: Adversary A outputs a guess bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. if b′ = b, A wins.
Deﬁnition 2. An IBCPRE scheme is IND-aCon-aID-CCA-secure at original ciphertext if for any probabilistic polynomial time 
(PPT) adversary A, his advantage is negligible, where A’s advantage is deﬁned as  = Adv IBCPRE-2ndA (1λ) =
∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b] − 12
∣∣∣.
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3.3. Review Liang et al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE construction
We review Liang et al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE construction [33]. Their construction is based on Waters’s IBE scheme [35], 
a strongly existential unforgeable one-time signature scheme [36], a pseudo-random function family [37] and a target colli-
sion resistant (TCR) hash function, it is speciﬁed by the following algorithms:
• Setup(1λ): Run (q, g, G1, G2, e) ← G . Let w ∈ {0, 1}n be an n-bit condition string. Choose α ∈ RZ∗p , g2, u′1, u′2, u′3, u3,0 ∈
RG1, three random n-length sets U1 = {u1,i |1 ≤ i ≤ n}, U2 = {u2,i |1 ≤ i ≤ n}, U3 = {u3,i |1 ≤ i ≤ n}, u1,i, u2,i, u3,i ∈R G1, 
a pseudorandom function PRF: G2 × G1 → {0, 1}λ1 , and a TCR hash function H1 : G2 → G1, where λ1 is a security pa-
rameter. The master secret key is msk = gα2 , the master public key is mpk = (λ, λ1, g, g1, g2, u′1, u′2, u′3, u3,0, U1, U2, U3, 
PRF, H1, (Sign.KeyGen, Sign, Verify)), where g1 = gα .
• KeyGen(msk, I D): Output skID = (skID1 , skID2 ) = (gα2 · (u′1
∏
i∈VI D u1,i)
r, gr), where r ∈ RZ∗q , I D ∈ {0, 1}n , and let VI D be 
the set of all i for which the i’th bit of I D is set to 1.
• Enc(I Di, w, m): Run (KS , KV ) ← Sign.KeyGen(1λ), choose t ∈ RZ∗q , σ ∈ RG2, generate the ciphertext: C0 = [PRF(σ , 
C2)]λ1−λ||[PRF(σ ,C2)]λ ⊕ m, C1 = e(g1, g2)t · σ , C2 = gt , C3 = (u′1
∏
i∈VI Di u1,i)
t , C4 = (u′2
∏
i∈ξw u2,i)
t , C5 = (u′3u3,0∏
i∈XKV u3,i)
t , C6 = Sign(KS , (C0, C2, C3, C4, C5)), and output C (2)(I Di ,w) = (KV , C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6), where I Di ∈
{0,1}n, m ∈ {0,1}λ , let ξw , XKV , VI Di be the sets of all i for which the i’th bit of w , KV , I Di is set to 1, respectively.• ReKeyGen(skIDi , I D j, w): Choose ρ, t′ ∈ RZ∗p , θ ∈ RG2, compute rk0 = skIDi1 · (u′2
∏
i∈ξw u2,i)
ρ , rk1 = gρ , rk2 = skIDi2 ·
H1(θ), rk3 = e(g1, g2)t′ · θ , rk4 = gt′ , rk5 = (u′1
∏
i∈VI D j u1,i)
t ′ , rk6 = (u′3u3,0
∏
i∈XK ′V
u3,i)t ′ , rk7 = Sign(K ′S , rk3, rk4, 
rk5, rk6)), and output rkw|I Di→I D j = (K ′V , rk0, rk1, rk2, rk3, rk4, rk5, rk6, rk7), where I D j ∈ {0,1}n and (K ′S , K ′V ) ←
Sign.KeyGen(1λ).
• ReEnc(rkw|I Di→I D j , I Di, w, C (2)(I Di ,w)): Verify the following equations (1) hold or not:
e(g,C3)
?= e(C2,u′1
∏
i∈VI D
u1,i) e(g,C4)
?= e(C2,u′2
∏
i∈ξw
u2,i)
e(g,C5)
?= e(C2,u′3u3,0
∏
i∈XKV
u3,i) V eri f y(KV ,C6, (C0,C2,C3,C4,C5))
?= 1 (1)
If equations (1) don’t hold, output ⊥; else compute: C ′1 = C1·e(rk2,C3)e(rk0,C2)/e(rk1,C4) , and output the transformed ciphertext 
C (1)(I D j ,w) = (KV , C0, C ′1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, K ′V , rk3, rk4, rk5, rk6, rk7).
• Dec2(I Di, skIDi , w, C (2)(I Di ,w)): Verify equations (1). If equations (1) don’t hold, output ⊥; else compute σ = C1 ·
e(skIDi2
,C3)
e(skIDi1
,C2)
, 
and output m = [C0]λ ⊕ [PRF(σ , C2)]λ , if [PRF(σ , C2)]λ1−λ = [C0]λ1−λ holds; else output ⊥.
• Dec1(I Di, I D j, skID j , w, C (1)(I D j ,w)): Verify the following equations (2) hold or not:
e(g, rk5)
?= e(rk4,u′1
∏
i∈VI D
u1,i), e(g, rk6)
?= e(rk4,u′3u3,0
∏
i∈XKV
u3,i)
V eri f y(K ′V , rk7, (rk3, rk4, rk5, rk6))
?= 1
(2)
If equations (2) don’t hold, output ⊥; else compute θ = rk3 ·
e(skID j2
,rk5)
e(skID j1
,rk4)
. If equations (1) don’t hold, output ⊥, else 
compute σ = C ′1/e(H1(θ), C3), and output m = [PRF(σ ,C2)]λ ⊕ [C0]λ , if [PRF(σ ,C2)]λ1−λ = [C0]λ1−λ holds. Otherwise, 
output ⊥.
3.4. Security analysis for Liang et al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE construction
Liang et al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE construction [33] is based on Waters’s identity-based encryption (IBE) [35] scheme. In order 
to capture the chosen-ciphertext security, Liang et al. extended Waters’s IBE scheme by employing the technique introduced 
in [38]. Indeed, the extended Waters’s IBE scheme can achieve the chosen-ciphertext security in the traditional public key 
encryption setting. However, it cannot achieve the chosen-ciphertext security in the proxy re-encrypted setting. As an orginal 
ciphertext component in their construction is not veriﬁed, there might exist an adversity who issues the re-encryption oracle 
to break the security of their construction. Thus, we present two concrete attacks against their UniSH-IBCPRE construction 
[33] in the following.
First, we present an outside adversary A1 to break the security of Liang et al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE construction. The outside 
adversary A1 does not collude with the semi-trusted proxy. Second, we present an inside adversary A2 (semi-trusted proxy) 
who colluded with a delegatee before and recovers a part of the delegator’s private key. Although the semi-trusted proxy 
A2 cannot compromise the entire private key of the delegator, but it is enough for him to recover all the message of the 
delegator.
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Outside Attack
First, in the challenge phase, adversary A1 modiﬁes the challenge ciphertext component C (2)∗(I Di∗ ,w∗) to obtain a new (ill-
formed) ciphertext C
(2)∗
(I Di∗ ,w∗) . Then, in the query phase II, adversary A1 asks the re-encryption oracle to re-encrypt the new 
ciphertext C
(2)∗
(I Di∗ ,w∗) and gets a transformed ciphertext C
(1)∗′
(I D j ,w∗) , where I D j is a corrupted user (note that according to 
the security model, it is legal for adversary A1 to query the re-encryption oracle). Next, adversary A1 modiﬁes the trans-
formed ciphertext C
(1)∗′
(I D j ,w∗) to obtain the right re-encrypted ciphertext C
(1)∗
(I D j ,w∗) corresponding to the challenge ciphertext 
C (2)∗(I Di∗ ,w∗) . Thus, adversary A1 derives the underlying plaintext by decrypting C
(1)∗
(I D j ,w∗) using the corrupted private key skID j .
To explain more clearly, we present the concrete outside attack against Liang et al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE construction in the 
following. Let A1 be an outside adversary, A1 interacts with challenger C in the following game.
• Setup: Adversary A1 ﬁrst obtains the public parameters from challenger C .
• Query Phase I: Adversary A1 issues the Extract(I D j) oracle to obtain the private key of the I D j and adds I D j to a 
corrupted list.
• Challenge: Adversary A1 submits (I Di∗ , m0, m1, w∗) to challenger C , and then given the challenge ciphertext 
C (2)∗(I Di∗ ,w∗) = (K ∗V , C∗0, C∗1, C∗2, C∗3, C∗4, C∗5, C∗6): C∗0 = [P RF (σ ∗,C∗2)]
λ1−λ||([P RF (σ ∗,C∗2)]λ ⊕mβ), C∗1 = e(g1, g2)t
∗ ·σ ∗ , C∗2 =
gt
∗
, C∗3 = (u′1
∏
i∈VI Di∗ u1,i)
t∗ , C∗4 = (u′2
∏
i∈ξw u2,i)
t∗ , C∗5 = (u′3u3,0
∏
i∈χK∗V
u3,i)t
∗
, C∗6 = Sign(K ∗S , (C∗0, C∗2, C∗3, C∗4, C∗5)).
• Query Phase II: Adversary A1 issues the re-encryption oracle as follows: First, adversary A1 picks C1 ∈R G2, and 
lets C∗1 = C∗1 · C1. Then adversary A1 modiﬁes the challenge ciphertext C (2)∗(I Di∗ ,w∗) to obtain a new (ill-formed) ci-
phertext C
(2)∗
(I Di∗ ,w∗) = (K ∗V , C∗0, C∗1, C∗2, C∗3, C∗4, C∗5, C∗6). Now adversary A1 submits (I Di∗ , I D j, w∗, C
(2)∗
(I Di∗ ,w∗)) to the re-
encryption oracle. (Note that, although I D j is in the corrupt list, it is legal for adversary A1 to issue this query, since 
(I Di∗ , I D j, w∗, C
(2)∗
(I Di∗ ,w∗)) is not a derivate of (I Di∗ , I D j, w
∗, C (2)∗(I Di∗ ,w∗))). The main reason is that the re-encryption al-
gorithm ReEnc cannot check the validity of the ciphertext component C∗1 , so the re-encryption oracle still responds 
the re-encryption ciphertext Ĉ (1)
′
(I D j ,w∗) = ReEnc(params, ReKeyGen(params, skIDi∗ , I D j, w∗), I Di∗ , I D j, w∗, C
(2)∗
(I Di∗ ,w∗)) to 
adversary A1, where Ĉ (1)
′
(I D j ,w∗) = (K ∗V , C∗0, ̂C ′1, C∗2, C∗3, C∗4, C∗5, C∗6, K ′V , rk3, rk4, rk5, rk6, rk7). In fact, we have
Ĉ ′1 =
C∗1 · e(rk2,C3)
e(rk0,C2)/e(rk1,C4)
= C
∗
1 · C1 · e(rk2,C3)
e(rk0,C2)/e(rk1,C4)
Next, adversary A1 uses C1 to recover the real transformed ciphertext C ′1:
C
′
1 =
Ĉ ′1
C1
= C
∗
1 · C1 · e(rk2,C3)
C1·e(rk0,C2)/e(rk1,C4)
= C
∗
1 · e(rk2,C3)
e(rk0,C2)/e(rk1,C4)
.
Observe that, C
′
1 is transformed by the challenge ciphertext component C
∗
1 . Thus, the ciphertext C
(1)′
(I D j ,w∗) =
(K ∗V , C∗0, C
′
1, C
∗
2, C
∗
3, C
∗
4, C
∗
5, C
∗
6, K
′
V , rk3, rk4, rk5, rk6, rk7) is indeed transformed by the challenge ciphertext C
(2)∗
(I Di∗ ,w∗) . 
Now, adversary A1 uses the colluded private key skID j to obtain the underlying plaintext mβ by decrypting the re-
encryption ciphertext C
(1)′
(I D j ,w∗) .
• Guess: Adversary A1 outputs a bit β ′ .
Obviously, adversary A1 has non-negligible advantage to output β ′ = β . It implies that Liang et al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE scheme 
cannot obtain chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model.
Inside Attack
For a semi-trusted proxy A2, given the re-encryption key rkw|I Di→I D j = (K ′V , rk0, rk1, rk2, rk3, rk4, rk5, rk6, rk7), where 
rk2 = skIDi2 · H1(θ). Then the semi-trusted proxy A2 can transform the delegator’s ciphertext to the delegatee’s ciphertext. 
Assuming that the semi-trusted proxy A2 corrupts with a corresponding delegatee or it acts as a delegatee before, then it 
can obtain the value H1(θ). At last A2 can compute the second part private key skIDi2 of the delegator. After that, every 
time, once the delegator gives the re-encryption key to the semi-trusted proxy A2, then the semi-trusted proxy A2 can 
compute H1(θ ′) from the corresponding re-encryption key. Thus, the semi-trusted proxy A2 can use H1(θ ′) to decrypt the 
re-encryption ciphertext, and then it derives the corresponding plaintext every time. Obviously, this is very dangerous for 
the delegator and the delegatee, because all plaintext information are transparent for the semi-trusted proxy A2, although 
it cannot obtain the entire delegator’s private key.
To explain more clearly, we present a concrete inside attack against Liang et al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE scheme. Let A2 be a 
semi-trust proxy, A2 interacts with challenger C in the following game.
• Setup: Adversary A2 obtains the public parameters from challenger C .
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• Query phase I: Adversary A2 issues the following queries:
◦ Adversary A2 issues the corrupted extract Extract(I D j) oracle to obtain the private key of I D j and adds I D j to a 
corrupted list.
◦ Adversary A2 issues the re-encryption key generation oracle ReKeyExtract(I Di∗ , I D j, w), where I D j is corrupted, 
and gets rkw|I Di∗→I D j = (K ′V , rk0, rk1, rk2, rk3, rk4, rk5, rk6, rk7), where rk0 = skIDi∗1 · (u
′
2
∏
i∈ξw u2,i)
ρ , rk1 = gρ , 
rk2 = skIDi∗2 · H1(θ), rk3 = e(g1, g2)
t′ · θ , rk4 = gt′ , rk5 = (u′1
∏
i∈VI D j u1,i)
t′ , rk6 = (u′3u3,0
∏
i∈XK ′V
u3,i)t
′
, rk7 =
Sign(K ′S , (rk3, rk4, rk5, rk6)). Then, semi-trusted proxy A2 colludes the user I D j and uses the corrupted private key 
skID j = (skID j1 , skID j2) to compute θ = rk3 ·
e(skID j2 ,rk5)
e(skID j1 ,rk4)
, and then computes the second part of the delegator’s private 
key skIDi∗2
= rk2/H1(θ). (Note that although semi-trusted proxy A2 cannot recover the ﬁrst private key skIDi∗1 of the 
delegator I Di∗ , but it is enough for A2 to recover all the message encrypted under I Di∗ ).
• Challenge: Adversary A2 submits (I Di∗ , m0, m1, w∗) to challenger C , and then given the challenge ciphertext 
C (2)∗(I Di∗ ,w∗) = (K ∗V , C∗0, C∗1, C∗2, C∗3, C∗4, C∗5, C∗6) as follows: C∗0 = [PRF(σ ∗,C∗2)]
λ1−λ||[PRF(σ ∗,C∗2)]λ ⊕ mβ , C∗1 = e(g1, g2)t
∗ ·
σ ∗ , C∗2 = gt
∗
, C∗3 = (u′1
∏
i∈VI D u1,i)
t∗ , C∗4 = (u′2
∏
i∈ξw u2,i)
t∗ , C∗5 = (u′3u3,0
∏
i∈χK∗V
u3,i)t
∗
, C∗6 = Sign(K ∗S , (C∗0, C∗2, C∗3, C∗4,
C∗5)).• Query Phase II: In this phase, adversary A2 issues the following queries:
Adversary A2 continues to issue the re-encryption key generation oracle ReKeyExtract(I Di∗ , I Dk, w∗), where I Dk is un-
corrupt, challenger C gives the re-encryption key rkw∗|I Di∗→I Dk = (K ′V , rk0, rk1, rk2, rk3, rk4, rk5, rk6, rk7) to A2, where 
rk2 = skIDi∗2 · H1(ϑ). Thus, adversary A2 can compute H1(ϑ) = rk2/skIDi∗2 using the obtained private key skIDi∗2 . (Adver-
sary A2 does not need to corrupt any delegatee now.)
Next, adversary A2 runs the re-encryption algorithm ReEnc(rkw∗|I Di∗→I Dk , I Di∗ , w∗, C (2)(I Di∗ ,w∗)) to obtain re-encryption 
ciphertext C (1)
′
(I Dk,w∗) = (K ∗V , C∗0, C∗
′
1 , C
∗
2, C
∗
3, C
∗
4, C
∗
5, C
∗
6, K
∗′
V , rk3, rk4, rk5, rk6, rk7), where C
∗′
1 = C
∗
1 ·e(rk2,C3)
e(rk0,C2)/e(rk1,C4)
= σ ∗ ·
e(H1(ϑ), C∗3). Thus, adversary A2 can compute σ ∗ = C∗
′
1 /e(H1(ϑ), C
∗
3). At last, adversary A2 can easily compute 
mβ = [PRF(σ ∗,C∗2)]λ ⊕ [C∗0]λ . (Note that A2 does not use the colluded private key of user I D j to obtain the plain-
text mβ .)
• Guess: Adversary A2 outputs β ′ .
Obviously, semi-trusted proxy A2 has non-negligible advantage to output β ′ = β . It implies that semi-trusted proxy A2
can recover all the message of the delegator as long as A2 colludes with one delegatee one time. Hence, Liang et al.’s 
UniSH-IBCPRE scheme cannot obtain chosen-ciphertext security.
4. Cryptanalysis of Liang et al.’s BiMH-IBCPRE scheme
In this section, ﬁrst, we shall review the deﬁnition, security model and the construction of Liang et al.’s BiMH-IBCPRE 
scheme [34]. Then, we give the security analysis for their construction [34].
4.1. Review the deﬁnition of Liang et al.’s BiMH-IBCPRE scheme
Deﬁnition 3. A BiMH-IBVPRE scheme 
∏ = (Setup, KeyGen, Re-Encryption Key Generation Protocol, Enc, ReEnc, Dec) consists 
of the following algorithms and protocols.
• Setup(1λ, n): On input a security parameter 1λ , and n ∈N the allowable maximum number of condition in the system, 
output a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk for Private Key Generator (PKG).
• KeyGen(mpk, msk, I D): On input mpk, msk, and an identity I D ∈ {0, 1}∗ , output a private key skID for the identity I D .
• Re-Encryption Key Generation Protocol: For simplicity, i and j denotes I Di and I D j in the re-encryption key.
◦ PReKeyGen(mpk, skID j , W ): On input mpk, a private key skID j for identity I D j , and a condition set W = {wz|1 ≤ z ≤
n, wz ∈ {0, 1}∗}, the partial re-encryption key generation algorithm PReKeyGen outputs a partial re-encryption key 
prk(W , j) under W and I D j .
◦ ReKeyGen(mpk, skIDi , prk(W , j), W ): On input mpk, a private key skIDi for identity I Di , a partial re-encryption key 
prk(W , j) and a set W of conditions, the re-encryption key algorithm ReKeyGen outputs a re-encryption key rki→ j|W
from I Di to I D j under W . Note I Di and I D j are two distinct identities.
◦ ReKeyBiGen(rki→ j|W ): On input a re-encryption key rki→ j|W from an identity I Di to another identity I D j under 
a set W of conditions, the re-encryption key derivation algorithm outputs a new re-encryption key rk j→i|W from 
I D j to I Di under W . Note that this algorithm also allows the re-encryption key rk j→i|W holder to generate a new 
re-encryption key rki→ j|W .
• Enc(mpk, I Di, W , m): On input mpk, an identity I Di , a set W of conditions and a message m ∈ {0, 1}λ , the encryption 
algorithm Enc outputs a ciphertext (i.e. original ciphertext) C(I Di ,W ) under I Di and W . Note that I Di and W are 
implicitly included in the ciphertext.
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• ReEnc(mpk, rki→ j|W , C(I Di ,W )): On input mpk, a re-encryption key rki→ j|W , and a ciphertext C(I Di ,W ) , the re-encryption 
algorithm ReEnc outputs a re-encrypted ciphertext C(I D j ,W ) or a symbol ⊥ indicating that the ciphertext C(I Di ,W ) is 
invalid.
• Dec(mpk, skIDi , C(I Di ,W )): On input mpk, a private key skIDi for identity I Di , and a ciphertext C(I Di ,W ) , the decryption 
algorithm Dec outputs a message m or a symbol ⊥ indicating that the ciphertext C(I Di ,W ) is invalid.
4.2. Review the security model of Liang et al.’s BiMH-IBCPRE scheme
In this section, we review the IND-sCon-sID-CCA security model for Liang et at.’s BiMH-IBCPRE scheme [34]. C is the 
challenger who plays the game with adversary A.
• Init: A outputs a challenge identity I D∗ and a conditions set W ∗ to C .
• Setup: C runs Setup(1λ, n) and sends mpk to A.
• Phase 1: A is given access to the following oracles.
◦ Private key extraction oracleOsk(I D): On input an identity I D , C returns skID ← KeyGen(msk, I D) to A.
◦ Re-encryption key extraction oracleOrk(I Di, I D j, W ): On input two distinct identities I Di and I D j , and a condi-
tion set W , C returns a re-encryption key rki→ j|W ← ReKeyGen(skIDi , PReKeyGen(skID j , W ), W ), where skIDi ←
KeyGen(msk, I Di), skID j ← KeyGen(msk, I D j), and I Di, I D j ∈ {0, 1}∗ . Note that A can derive rk j→i|W from rki→ j|W
with algorithm ReKeyBiGen.
◦ Re-encryption oracleOre(I Di, I D j, W , C(I Di ,W )): On input two distinct identities I Di and I D j , a condition set W , and 
a ciphertext C(I Di ,W ) under I Di and W , C returns a re-encrypted ciphertext C(I D j ,W ) ← ReEnc(rki→ j|W , C(I Di ,W )), 
where rki→ j|W ← ReKeyBiGen(ri j→i|W ), and further re-encrypts C(I Di ,W ) to Ore . If so, C will ﬁrst generate rk j→i|W
and get rki→ j|W ← ReKeyBiGen(rk j→i|W ), and further re-encrypt C(I Di ,W ) using rki→ j|W .◦ Decryption oracleOdec(I Di, C(I Di ,W )): On input an identity I Di , and a ciphertext C(I Di ,W ) , C returns m ← Dec(skIDi , 
C(I Di ,W )), where skIDi ← KeyGen(msk, I Di), I Di ∈ {0, 1}∗ . Note that if A issues invalid ciphertext to Ore or Odec , C
simply outputs ⊥. Moreover, the following queries cannot be issued:
(1) Osk(I D), if I D∗ = I D or for any I D in an uncorrupted delegation chain under W ∗ which includes I D∗;
(2) Ork(I Di, I D j, W ∗) for any distinct I Di and I D j , if I D∗ will be in a corrupted delegation chain under W ∗ after 
issuing the corresponding re-encryption key.
• Challenge: A outputs two distinct equal length messages (m0, m1) to C . C returns the challenge ciphertext C∗(I D∗,W ∗) =
Enc(I D∗, W ∗, mb) to A, where b ∈ R (0,1).
• Phase 2: A continues making queries except the followings:
(1) Osk(I D) if I D∗ = I D or for any I D in an uncorrupted delegation chain under W ∗ which includes I D∗ .
(2) Ork(I Di, I D j, W ∗) for any distinct I Di and I D j , if I D∗ will be in a corrupted delegation chain under W ∗ after 
issuing the corresponding re-encryption key.
(3) Ore(I Di, I D j, W ∗, C(I Di ,W ∗)) if (I Di, W ∗, C(I Di ,W ∗)) is a derivative of (I D∗, W ∗, C∗(I D∗,W ∗)), but I D j is a corrupted 
identity or I D j is in a corrupted delegation chain. As of [11], a derivative of (I D∗, W ∗, C∗(I D∗,W ∗)) is deﬁned as follows.
◦ (I D∗, W ∗, C∗(I D∗,W ∗)) is a derivative of itself.
◦ If (I Di, W ∗, C∗(I Di ,W ∗)) is a derivative of (I D∗, W ∗ , C∗(I D∗,W ∗)), and (I Di′ , W ∗, C(I Di′ ,W ∗)) is a derivative of (I Di, W ∗ , 
C(I Di ,W ∗)), then (I Di′ , W
∗, C(I Di′ ,W ∗)) is a derivative of (I D
∗, W ∗, C∗
(I D∗,W ∗)).
◦ If A has issued a re-encryption key query on (I Di, I D j, W ) to obtain rki→ j|W , and achieved C(I D j ,W ) ←
ReEnc(rki→ j|W , C(I Di ,W )) then (I D j, W , C(I D j ,W )) is a derivative of (I Di, W , C(I Di ,W )).◦ If A can run C(I D j ,W ) ← ReEnc(ReKeyGen(skIDi , prk(W , j), W ), C(I Di ,W )), then (I D j, W , C(I D j ,W )) is a derivative of 
(I Di, W , C(I Di ,W )), where skIDi ← KeyGen(msk, I Di), prk(W , j) ← PreKeyGen(skID j , W ) and skID j ← KeyGen(msk, I D j).◦ If A has issued a re-encryption query on (I Di, I D j, W , C(I Di ,W )) and obtained C(I D j ,W ) , then (I D j, W , C(I D j ,W )) is a 
derivative of (I Di, W , C(I Di ,W )).
(4) Odec(I Di, C(I Di ,W ∗)) if (I Di, W ∗, C(I Di ,W ∗)) is a derivative of (I D∗, W ∗, C∗(I D∗,W ∗)).
• Guess: A outputs a guess bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Deﬁnition 4. A BiMH-IBCPRE scheme is IND-sCon-sID-CCA secure if for any PPT adversary A wins the above game with 
negligible advantage 1 = Adv IND-sCon-sID-CCABiMH-IBCPRE,A (1λ, n) = |Pr[b′ = b] − 1/2|.
4.3. Review Liang et al.’s BiMH-IBCPRE construction
Let’s review Liang et al.’s BiMH-IBCPRE construction [34]. Their construction is based a hierarchical identity-based en-
cryption (HIBE) [39], a pseudorandom function [37], and a one-time signature scheme [36]. It is speciﬁed by the following 
algorithms:
• Setup(1λ, n): Given the security parameter λ and n the allowable maximum number of conditions in the sys-
tem (here n = 1), run (q, g, G1, GT , e) ← G(1λ), choose α ∈ RZ∗p , f1, f2, g2, g3, h1, h2, h3 ∈ RG1, and prepare a pseu-
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dorandom function PRF:GT × G1 → {0, 1}λ1 (which takes an element in GT as the function key and an ele-
ment in G1 as input, and outputs a λ1-bit pseudorandom string), where λ1 is a security parameter as well. 
Let w ∈ Z∗q be a condition, (Sign.KeyGen,Sign,Verify) be an OTS scheme, and assume the veriﬁcation key out-
put by Sign.KeyGen(1λ) is in Z∗q . The master secret key is msk = gα2 , and the master public key is mpk =
(q, g, G1, GT , e, f1, f2, g1, g2, g3, h1, h2, h3, PRF, (Sign.KeyGen,Sign,Verify)), where g1 = gα .
• KeyGen(msk, I D): Given the master secret key msk and an identity I D (i.e. an identity I = (I D)), choose r ∈ RZ∗q , and 
output the key skID = (gα2 · (hID1 · g3)r, gr, hr2, hr3) ∈ G41 . A system user with knowledge of skID can generate the following 
private key due to the key derivation of HIBE. Given skID = (a0, a1, b2, b3), I = (I D, w), choose a t ∈ RZ∗q and output 
sk(I D,w) = (a0 · bw2 · (hID1 · hw2 · g3)t , a1 · gt , b3 · ht3) = (gα2 · (hID1 · hw2 · g3)r
′
, gr
′
, hr
′
2 , h
r′
3 ) ∈ G41 , where r′ = r + t .• Enc(I Di, w, m): Given an identity I Di , a condition w and a message m, choose an OTS key pair (Ks, Kv) ←
Sign.KeyGen(1λ) and σ ∈ RGT , s ∈ RZ∗q , set C0 = Kv , C1 = [PRFσ (C3)]λ1−λ||[PRFσ (C3)]λ ⊕m, C2 = σ · e(g1, g2)s , C3 = gs , 
C4 = (hIDi1 · hw2 · hKv3 · g3)s , C5 = ( f w1 · f2)s , C6 = Sign(Ks, (C1, C3, C4, C5)), and output the transformed ciphertext 
C(I Di ,w)=((I Di, w), C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6), where I Di ∈Z∗q , m ∈ {0, 1}λ .• Re-Encryption Key Generation Protocol:
◦ PReKeyGen(sk(I D j ,w)). I D j ﬁrst deduces sk(I D j ,w) = (a0 j, a1 j, b3 j) (under I = (I D j, w)) from skID j , next chooses 
ρ1, ρ2 ∈ RZ∗q and sets β1 = a−10 j · ( f w1 · f2)ρ1 , β2 = gρ1 , β3 = a−11 j · gρ2 , β4 = b−13 j · hρ23 , β5 = (hw2 · g3)ρ2 , β6 = hρ21 . I D j
then sends the partial re-encryption key prk(w, j) = (β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6) to I Di .
◦ ReKeyGen(skIDi , prk(w, j), w). I Di ﬁrst generates sk(I Di ,w) = (a0i, a1i, b3i) (under I = (I Di, w)), chooses ρ3, ρ4 ∈ RZ∗q , 
computes rk1 = a0i · β1 · ( f w1 · f2)ρ3 , rk2 = gρ3 · β2, rk3 = a1i · β3 · gρ4 , rk4 = b3i · β4 · hβ43 , rk5 = (hw2 · g3)ρ4 · β5, 
rk6 = hρ41 · β6 and outputs rki→ j|w = (rk1, rk2, rk3, rk4, rk5, rk6).◦ Derive a new re-encryption key rk j→i|w from rki→ j|w by running rk j→i|w ← ReKeyBiGen(rki→ j|w). The proxy sets 
rk j→i|w = rk−1i→ j|w , i.e. rk j→i|w = (rk−11 , rk−12 , rk−13 , rk−14 , rk−15 , rk−16 ).
• ReEnc(rki→ j|w , C(I Di ,w)): Given a re-encryption key rki→ j|w and a ciphertext C(I Di ,w) , the re-encryption algorithm 
works as follows.
(a). Verify the validity of the ciphertext:
e(C3, f
w
1 · f2) ?= e(g,C5)
e(C3,h
IDi
1 · hw2 · hC03 · g3) ?= e(g,C4)
V eri f y(C0,C6, (C1,C3,C4,C5))
?= 1
(3)
If Eq. (3) does not hold, output ⊥.
(b). Compute C ()2 = C
(−1)
2 ·e(rk3,C4)·e(rk2,C5)
e(rk1·rkC04 ·rk
IDi
6 ·rk5,C3)
, output the re-encrypted ciphertext C(I D j ,w) = ((I Di, w), C0, C1, C ()2 , C3, C4,
C5, C6), where  ≥ 2 denotes the level of the ciphertext. If  = 1, C (1)2 is from the transformed ciphertext.• Dec(skIDi , C(I Di ,w)): Given a private key skIDi for I Di and a ciphertext C(I Di ,w) , the decryption algorithm works as 
follows. I Di ﬁrst deduces the private key skIDi for sk(I Di ,w) = (a0i, a1i, b3i) (under I = (I Di, w)) from skIDi (under 
I = (I Di)), and next does the followings. (a) Verify the validity of the ciphertext by checking Eq. (3). If the equation does 
not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed. (b) Compute ρ = C (l)2 · e(a1i ,C4)e(a0i ·bC03i ,C3)
, and then verify [PRFδ(C3)]λ1−λ = [C1]λ1−λ . If 
the equation holds, output m = [C1]λ ⊕ [PRFδ(C3)]λ . Otherwise, output ⊥.
4.4. Security analysis for Liang et al.’s BiMH-IBCPRE construction
In the following, we shall present one concrete outside attack against Liang et al.’s BiMH-IBCPRE construction [34]. The 
attack is the same as the above outside attack for Liang et al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE construction [33]. Let A1 be a PPT attacker, 
A1 interacts with challenger C in the following.
Outside Attack
• Setup: The same as in the above Outside Attack.
• Query phase I: The same as in the above Outside Attack.
• Challenge: Adversary A1 submits (I Di∗ , m0, m1, w∗) to challenger C , then given the challenge ciphertext C∗(I Di∗ ,w) =
((I Di∗ , w∗), C∗0, C∗1, C∗2, C∗3, C∗4, C∗5, C∗6) as follows: C∗0 = K ∗v , C∗1 = [PRFσ ∗ (C∗3)]λ1−λ||[PRFσ ∗ (C∗3)]λ ⊕ mβ , C∗2 = σ ∗ ·
e(g1, g2)s , C∗3 = gs , C∗4 = (hIDi∗1 · hw
∗
2 · hK
∗
v
3 · g3)s , C∗5 = ( f w
∗
1 · f2)s , C∗6 = Sign(K ∗s , (C∗1, C∗3, C∗4, C∗5)).• Query Phase II: Adversary A1 issues the re-encryption oracle as follows:
Adversary A1 ﬁrst randomly picks C2 ∈ G2 and lets C∗2 = C∗2 · C2. Then adversary A1 modiﬁes the challenge ciphertext 
to obtain a new (ill-formed) ciphertext C
∗
(I Di∗ ,w∗) = ((I Di∗ , w∗), C∗0, C∗1, C∗2, C∗3, C∗4, C∗5, C∗6). Now adversary A1 submits 
(I Di∗ , I D j, w∗, C
∗
(I Di∗ ,w∗)) to the re-encryption oracle. (Note that, although I D j is in the corrupt list, it is legal for A1
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to issue this query, since (I Di∗ , I D j, w∗, C
∗
(I Di∗ ,w∗)) is not a derivate of (I Di∗ , I D j, w
∗, C∗(I Di∗ ,w∗)).) As the re-encryption 
algorithm ReEnc cannot check the validity of the ciphertext component C∗2 . So the re-encryption oracle can return 
the re-encryption ciphertext Ĉ∗(I D j ,w∗) = ReEnc(params, ReKeyGen(params, skIDi∗ , I D j, w∗), I Di∗ , I D j, w∗, C
∗
(I Di∗ ,w∗)) to 
adversity A, where Ĉ∗(I D j ,w∗) = ((I Di∗ , w∗), C∗0, C∗1, ̂C∗2, C∗3, C∗4, C∗5, C∗6) and Ĉ∗2 =
C∗2 ·e(rk3,C4)·e(rk2,C5)
e(rk1·rkC04 ·rk
IDi
6 ·rk5,C3)
. Then, adversary A1
uses C2 to compute C
′
2 as follows:
C
′
2 =
Ĉ∗2
C2
= C
∗
2 · C2 · e(rk3,C4) · e(rk2,C5)
C2·e(rk1 · rkC04 · rkIDi6 · rk5,C3)
= C
∗
2 · e(rk3,C4) · e(rk2,C5)
e(rk1 · rkC04 · rkIDi6 · rk5,C3)
.
Observe that, we ﬁnd C
′
2 is transformed by the challenge ciphertext component C
∗
2 . Thus, the modiﬁed re-encryption ci-
phertext C
′
(I D j ,w∗) = ((I Di∗ , w∗), C∗0, C∗1, C
′
2, C
∗
3, C
∗
4, C
∗
5, C
∗
6) is indeed the result of ReEnc(rkw∗|I Di∗→I D j , I Di∗ ,
w∗, C∗(I Di∗ ,w∗)), which is an encryption of mβ . Now, adversary A1 can obtain the underlying plaintext mβ by decrypting 
the re-encryption ciphertext C
(1)′
(I D j ,w∗) using user I D j ’s private key skID j .
• Guess: Adversary A1 outputs β ′ .
Obviously, adversary A1 has non-negligible advantage to output β ′ = β . It implies that Liang et al.’s BiMH-IBCPRE Scheme 
is not chosen-ciphertext secure.
5. Conclusion
We present some concrete attacks to Liang et al.’s UniSH-IBCPRE scheme [33] and BiMH-IBCPRE scheme [34]. In their 
schemes, the non-malleable cannot be ensured for their original ciphertexts. Although all components of the original ci-
phertext are signed by the one-time signature scheme, except one component (e.g. the component C1 in the UniSH-IBCPRE 
scheme [33] and the component C2 in the BiMH-IBCPRE scheme [34]). Of course, signing all components can prevent our 
concrete attack, but the resultant is that their schemes are not PRE schemes any longer. Hence, the problems of how to 
construct a UniSH-IBCPRE scheme and a BiMH-IBCPR scheme with chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model are 
still open.
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